More on Iran

Matthew Yglesias challenges the conventional wisdom on Iran over at TPM.

It is curious to me that Iran, especially after having been invaded by Iraq in 1980, has not sought to more aggressively build up its military capability. This is a country that has seven national borders: Iraq, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. It must take a great deal of diplomacy to manage relationships with seven bordering neighbors when you're not the one carrying the biggest stick. I have to say, if I were an Iranian I'd want a much bigger posture in the region.

I still think Ahmadinejad poses a threat -- not so much for the power he wields (widely disputed among those who are more familiar with Iran's government hierarchy) but rather for his rhetoric and growing charasmatic influence among the peoples of the region. From the Chatham House Report:

The ideology of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

The sudden emergence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President of the Islamic Republic and successor to the moderate Mohammed Khatami in June 2005 proved a considerable shock to the political community, not least within Iran itself. The new president appeared similarly surprised by his election and immediately interpreted it as part of his manifest destiny. According to this, his role was to create the ‘Third Islamic Revolution’, the Second Islamic Revolution having been represented by the seizure of the US embassy in 1979 which allowed the Islamists to consolidate their power after the initial overthrow of the Shah in 1978. Much like the original, the development and success of this revolutionary era had less to do with practical political measures, strategies and manipulation, and more to do with divine providence.

For Ahmadinejad and his closest supporters, his election was an empowering moment which served to cement his political and ideological convictions.

For his opponents, many of whom are part of the traditional and largely conservative elite,
Ahmadinejad’s election was the worst of all possible worlds. Not only has he threatened their
political and economic interests, but his ideological convictions and lack of flexibility have made him difficult to bend to their views, and well-nigh impossible to accommodate. His rhetoric has tended to inflame tensions and unsettle the domestic economy and private sector, while the wide-reaching changes he has introduced to official and ministerial appointments have upset the continuity of the public administration, even where – as in appointing a new oil minister the autumn of 2005 – he failed to gain acceptance for his preferred candidates.

Far more serious in terms of Iran’s external status has been Ahmadinejad’s attitude towards the international community, and the West in particular. In contrast to the broadly accommodating tone of Khatami, Ahmadinejad’s whole philosophy has favoured and promoted confrontation. His rationale is that there is nothing to be gained through any form of compromise that the West would exploit as weakness. Many of his opponents have grown concerned that this policy of confrontation is bereft of any underlying strategy other than being an end in itself.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is undoubtedly the most ideological president to occupy the post since the revolution of 1979. Both previous incumbents (Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1989–1997 and Mohammed Khatami, 1997–2005) tended to follow a pragmatic policy of détente, combined with a gentle easing of revolutionary fervour, especially in the international sphere. Ahmadinejad has openly condemned this approach and derided the period since 1989 as one in which the values and morals of the revolution were perverted and polluted by material corruption. While he has reserved most of his venom for the presidency of Khatami, his comments have also led to a serious deterioration of relations with Hashemi Rafsanjani, his main rival in the presidential campaign of 2005.

The source of Ahmadinejad’s ideological fervour can be traced to a large extent to his own personal experience as a member of the pasdaran, or Revolutionary Guards. Like many of his supporters and closest associates who are now in their forties, Ahmadinejad is a child of the revolution and the war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988. His experience of war was the high moment of the first postrevolutionary years, when morality superseded material gain and Iranians were truly fraternal Muslims. For him, the war was far from being an event to be regretted and avoided, but was, for all its pain, a purifying moment which cleansed the corruption which had accrued during the previous regime. In this sense, Ahmadinejad came to see himself in effect as a literal adherent of Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionary rhetoric.

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In his return to the founding principles of the Islamic Republic, Ahmadinejad can best be described as emblematic of Iran’s neo-conservative movement. His reliance on the power of divine providence can be seen in his description of Israel and the United States as ungodly and unjust states that will inevitably collapse. Contrary to some external perceptions, Ahmadinejad does not believe he needs to do anything to encourage this collapse but, since it is inevitable, there is no need to talk to or engage with these states either.

Such religious convictions blend well with the other streams of nationalist and anti-colonial thought which also pervade Iranian politics. Indeed arguably, for all Ahmadinejad’s overt religious convictions, he has had to present himself as a defender of Iran’s national rights and has used the nuclear crisis to good effect in this regard. How well this has been received within broader Iranian opinion is a matter of debate, but the exploitation of nationalist sentiment, and the view that Iranians have a durable (and unchanging) history, as well as an inherently imperial role in the region, have undoubtedly landed on receptive ground.

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